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I

legal architecture of this Organization,2 and is binding on
all OAS Member States. Under Article 106 of the Charter,
the primary function of the Commission is to “promote the
observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a
consultative organ of the [OAS] in these matters.” The notion
of “protection” necessarily involves the
power to receive and adjudicate human
rights cases. Thus, every American
state has accepted the competence
of the Commission to consider individual complaints concerning alleged
human rights violations that occur
in their jurisdiction just by ratifying
the Charter.3

n recent years, several states of the Americas have raised
concerns regarding the mandate and practice of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (the Commission,
IACHR) in several areas, including the adoption of precautionary
measures. In order to better understand the legal underpinnings
of such discussion, it is important
to review the scope and normative
contours of precautionary measures
in the Inter-American Human Rights
System. This piece intends to provide
a general overview of some of the
most notable aspects that inform the
current debate in the political organs
of the Organization of American States
(OAS). The information provided below
will indicate that, contrary to what some
states argue, the Commission’s practice
in precautionary measures has been cautious but quite effective.

[Precautionary] measures
constitute one of the most
important instruments that the
Commission has . . . to achieve
one of the core aims of the
Inter-American Human Rights
System: preventing on-going
human rights violations.

For those states that have not yet
ratified the American Convention, the
Commission will determine whether
the state violated the rights set forth
in the American Declaration.4 The
Commission and the Inter-American
Court have both held that the
Declaration, although not initially adopted as a legally binding treaty, is now a source of legal obligation for OAS Member
States.5 Additionally, by approving the Commission’s Statute,
Member States have established the Commission’s authority
to receive and decide individual complaints alleging violations of the Declaration against those who are not parties to
the Convention.6 Furthermore, the Commission has read the
Declaration as an evolving source of law, noting that its application is consistent with the practice of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights.7 Therefore, the Declaration serves as a parallel to the American Convention for those states that have not
ratified the Convention.

As defined by the Commission,
precautionary measures are “urgent
requests, directed to an OAS Member State, to take immediate
injunctive measures in serious and urgent cases, and whenever
necessary [. . .] to prevent irreparable harm to persons.”1 The
Commission primarily grants precautionary measures to protect
persons from grave and imminent danger of injury of rights recognized under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man (American Declaration) or the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention). Interim measures developed based on the understanding that it is essential for the victims
of human rights abuses to be able to resort to regional systems,
such as the Inter-American Human Rights System, to seek immediate protection of their basic rights recognized under regional
international treaties. In general, these measures constitute one of
the most important instruments that the Commission has at its disposal to achieve one of the core aims of the Inter-American Human
Rights System: preventing on-going human rights violations.

The requirement of extreme gravity and urgency to obtain
a grant of precautionary measures presumes the existence of
certain imminent danger that could result in irreparable harm
to the fundamental rights of persons.8 Article 25 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission, regulating its precautionary
measures, reflects comparable elements of gravity, urgency, and
irreparability recognized for the Inter-American Court in Article
63 of the American Convention.9 The mechanism established
in Article 25 of the Rules applies to all of the Member States
of the OAS, whether or not they have ratified the American
Convention, by virtue of the Commission’s Statute.

Normative Human Rights Structure of the OAS
As the principle multilateral treaty, the Charter of the
Organization of American States (OAS Charter) sets out the
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Timely implementation is often of grave importance when a
precautionary measure is requested, particularly where the life
or physical integrity of persons are at stake. For those facing
capital punishment, the implementation of the precautionary
13

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3
measure granted by the Commission is especially important. The
Commission has stated that

other communications pursuant to its authority under the provisions of Articles 44 through 51 of this Convention,” (provision
that is restated in Article 19 of the Statute) and to “request the
governments of the member states to supply it with information
on the measures adopted by them in matters of human rights.” As
all three instruments contemplate the promotion and observance
of human rights but do not specify the means through which to
do this, it is clear that the Commission has the authority to implement reasonable tools, such as precautionary measures, to fulfill
its duty to protect and promote human rights.

[T]he failure of a member state to preserve a condemned
prisoner’s life pending review by the Commission of
his or her complaint emasculates the efficacy of the
Commission’s process, deprives condemned persons of
their right to petition in the Inter-American system, and
results in serious and irreparable harm to those individuals, and accordingly is inconsistent with the state’s
human rights obligations.10

Additionally, the Inter-American System was the first system
to function in a region of the world where gross and systematic violations of human rights involving extra-judicial
killings, torture, and forced disappearances were prevalent.
Since its creation in 1948, the OAS
has adopted multiple treaties, including the Inter-American Convention
on Forced Disappearances of Persons,
the Inter-American Convention
to Prevent and Punish Torture, and
the Inter-American Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment, and
Eradication of Violence Against
Women (Belém Do Pará).13 These
treaties all imply the need to have
protective measures granted by the
Commission and the Court, particularly the Convention on Forced
Disappearances of Persons, thus supporting the legality of
IACHR precautionary measures.14

The fact that the precautionary measures of the Commission
are not explicitly included in the text of the American Convention
or the Commission’s Statute has raised questions from a few
countries regarding the authority that
supports such measures. Furthermore,
even if a sufficient basis exists for the
authorizations of such measures, the
question remains whether non-compliance with the measures constitutes
a failure to fulfill an international obligation of the State.

Legal Authority of the
Commission’s
Precautionary Measures

[I]t is clear that the
Commission has the authority
to implement reasonable tools,
such as precautionary measures,
to fulfill its duty to protect and
promote human rights.

The Commission has the power to
interpret the scope of its own competence and jurisdiction.11 In exercising such generic authority, the
Commission has found that this authority included precautionary
measures under Article 25 of the Rules of Procedures because

Binding Nature

OAS member states, by creating the Commission
and mandating it through the OAS Charter and the
Commission’s Statute to promote the observance and
protection of human rights of the American peoples,
have implicitly undertaken to implement measures of
this nature where they are essential to preserving the
Commission’s mandate.12

Precautionary measures are not only authorized in the normative structure that regulates the Commission, but compliance
by Member States of the OAS is also obligatory. States must
comply with their obligations under the basic principle of the
law of international responsibility and their obligations under
international treaties in good faith (pacta sunt servanda) in conformity with Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969.15 Thus, states cannot excuse non-compliance
on the basis of their domestic law. When states fail to adhere
to international human rights law by ignoring orders issued by
an international body exercising its statutory or conventional
authority, the state runs counter to the object and purpose of the
human rights regime, therefore violating the international instruments that govern the Commission’s functions. Furthermore,
such conduct by a state undermines international law and the
broader multinational political support for expanded international protection of human rights.16

Thus, precautionary measures appear to be recognized by the
Commission as an “inherent” power of its adjudicatory function in
individual cases. Such interpretation is firmly grounded in several
provisions of the Statute of the Commission, the OAS Charter,
and the American Convention. Article 18 of the Statute authorizes
the Commission “to request that the governments of the states provide it with reports on measures they adopt in matters of human
rights.” Article 106 of the OAS Charter entrusts the Commission
to, “promote the observance and protection of human rights.”
Regarding states not yet party to the American Convention,
Article 20 of the Commission Statute empowers the Commission
“to examine communications submitted to it and any other available information, to address the government of any member state
not a Party to the Convention for information deemed pertinent
by this Commission, and to make recommendations to it, when
it finds this appropriate, in order to bring about more effective
observance of fundamental human rights.” For states that have
ratified the American Convention, Article 41 of the Convention
grants the Commission the power “to take action on petitions and

In this vein, the Commission has reiterated that “its ability
to effectively investigate and determine capital cases has been
frequently undermined when states have scheduled and carried out the execution of condemned persons, despite the fact
that those individuals have proceedings pending before the
Commission.”17 Furthermore, the Commission determined that
when a Member State dismisses such orders, the State “disregards its fundamental human rights obligations under the OAS
Charter and related instruments.”18 The Inter-American Court
14
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Canada25 and Piandiong et al. v. The Philippines26 reaffirmed
the binding character that interim measures of such a Committee
have. The Committee articulated its legal rationale pursuant
to the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the principle of good faith in cooperating with the Committee. The
Committee indicated in Piandiong that interim measures

has also pointed out that, based on the principles of effectiveness
and good faith, States are to respect its provisional measures as
well as the Commission’s precautionary measures.19 In doing
so, States must “heed the recommendations contained in the
Commission’s reports and do their best to implement them,
pursuant to the principle of good faith.”20
The binding nature of the precautionary measures ordered
by the Commission,

are essential to the Committee’s role under the Protocol.
Flouting of the Rule, specially by irreversible measures
such as the execution of the alleged victim or his/her
deportation from the country, undermines the protection of the Covenant rights through the Optional
Protocol.27

depends on the general duty of the states to respect and
guarantee human rights, to adopt the legislative or other
measures necessary for effective observance of human
rights, and to carry out in good faith the obligations
contracted under the American Convention and the
Charter of the OAS, as well as the competence of the
Commission to oversee that the states parties are carrying
out the commitments they have assumed.21

The Committee has a similar nature to that of the InterAmerican Commission; they both share comparable normative
structures regarding interim measures and are both quasi-judicial
organs supervising human rights treaties with an individual
complaint mandate and the governing treaties in both cases
do not expressly refer to interim measures. If we consider that
the same approach taken by the Committee is applicable to
the Commission’s precautionary measures, the clear conclusion is that the Commission’s measures are authorized by the
Convention, the Statute, and its Rule of Procedure, and that
compliance of such measures by states is an obligation under
those instruments, and non-compliance would be a violation of
these regional instruments and therefore could entail the international responsibility of the State concerned.

The Commission also reaffirmed the legally binding nature
of its precautionary measures in its Resolution 1/05 of March 8,
2005, along with other documents issued by the Commission,
holding that Member States are under a duty to comply in light
of the fundamental role that the measures play in maintaining the
efficacy of the Commission’s mandates.22 Member States that
fail to recongize the binding nature of precautionary measures render the measures and the regional protection system ineffectual. In
response, the Commission has affirmed, on numerous occasions,
the necessity and duty of OAS Member States to comply with
the precautionary measures granted in order to properly and
fully respect their international human rights obligations.23

It is worth mentioning that the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have rendered similar
pronouncements confirming the obligatory nature of protective measures.28 The European Court and the ICJ have done so
even though their respective governing treaties do not expressly
recognize such interim measures for those international bodies.

The precautionary measures of the Inter-American
Commission require States to comply without exception of
domestic political or legal motives.24 Although precautionary
measures are not recognized as binding by all Member States of
the OAS, the measures should be afforded a comparable legal
value as those resolutions that the Commission adopts regarding
individual cases, such as reports on admissibility and/or merits.
As indicated above, the international principles of pacta sunt
servanda and good faith leave little room to interpret otherwise. OAS States have conferred on the Commission extensive
powers to promote and protect human rights under the Charter
of the OAS, the Statute of the Commission, the American
Convention and several other regional treaties. Furthermore, in
that framework, States have authorized the Commission to receive
individual complaints seeking to afford redress for the victims.
Therefore, under these mandates, the Commission is allowed,
and compelled, to articulate its powers in order to prevent, if
possible, violations of human rights, especially regarding serious
situations where danger is imminent and irreparable. To argue
otherwise would lead us to the unreasonable assumption that
States created the Commission with ample supervisory powers
but deliberately decided to limit the Commission from cooperating with them to prevent serious human rights violations.

Statements by Other Actors
Other actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
have also conveyed their views about the importance of precautionary measures. Public statements have been made addressing
the binding nature of the measures in reference to the Brazilian
government’s response to precautionary measures granted by
the Commission, including in an open letter to OAS Secretary
General José Miguel Insulza. NGOs, such as Conectas-Human
Rights and the International Federation of Human Rights
(FIDH), have emphasized the binding nature and importance of
precautionary measures. FIDH recently stated in an open letter
to Secretary General Insulza, “[W]e wish to emphasize that the
precautionary measures issued by the Commission, although
using the term ‘recommendation’ are binding on Member States
of the OAS[.]”29 In addition, Conectas issued a public statement
on the Brazilian government’s response to the Belo Monte case,30
indicating that “[i]n accordance with the new IACHR regulations, the Commission has the authority to request precautionary
measures to avoid irreparable damages[.]”31 Furthermore, the
Centro de Estudios en Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad (DeJusticia),
Conectas, the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL),
the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), the Instituto

Interim Measures of the Human Rights
Committee and other Adjudicatory Bodies
Other similar organs, such as the UN Human Rights
Committee, have also considered their interim measures as
obligatory. The Human Rights Committee, in Mansour Ahani v.
15
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de Defensa Legal (IDL), and the Due Process of Law Foundation
(DPLF) have stated that the Commission’s precautionary measures are an inherent power of this organ and that a consistent
regional practice during more than two decades suggests the
existence of a norm based on international customary law.32 All
these organizations, as well as the Commission, have expressed
concern over the lack of adherence to, and downplay of, precautionary measures and they continue to emphasize the significance and necessity of preserving them.33

jurisdiction and admissibility of cases or factual grounds to
request precautionary measures. For example, only 15.8% of the
petitions filed were accepted for processing in 2011 and only
13.5% of the requests for precautionary measures were finally
rendered in 2011.
It should also be noted that the Commission has issued more
than 780 precautionary measures from 1995 to 2012, focusing
mostly on the core basic rights recognized by the human rights
instruments. A recent study has shown that the Commission
has adopted a great majority of its measures in cases where life
and personal integrity were at stake.34 This study indicates that
measures adopted from 1996 to 2010 were issued to protect
mainly civil and political rights, and “particularly the right to life
(Article 4) with 599 measures and the right to humane treatment
(Article 5) with 528 measures from a
total of 688.”35 In very few cases has
the Commission refered to other rights
such as freedom of expression (24
precautionary measures), health (18),
property (12), political rights (3), work
(3), cultural identity (3), or right to
information (3). Evidently precautionary measures have been used mostly
in serious situations in which life or
personal integrity of persons are at
stake. This shows that the Commission
has clearly exercised restraint when
dealing with situations that involve
more complex rights where the determination of “gravity” and
“urgency” requires a more refined and cautious analysis.

Some Comments about the Commission’s Practice
and the Current ‘Reform’ Debate
The Inter-American Commission is currently facing one
of the most significant challenges in its history. For years,
several Member States of the OAS
have periodically advanced the idea
of “strengthening” or “reforming”
the System, but in the end, no additional political or financial support has
been dispensed to the Inter-American
Commission or the Inter-American
Court. In fact, many of the calls for
“reform” have come from some of the
same States that have been under strict
scrutiny of the System due to their precarious human rights situation. These
calls, therefore, appear to be a reaction
by those States to supervisory actions
of the Commission and the Court, and appear to be seeking to
undermine the independence and autonomy of the Commission.
Furthermore, one of the issues triggering such reaction has been
precisely that of the precautionary measures in certain cases.

[M]any of the calls for
“reform” have come from some
of the same States that have
been under strict scrutiny of the
System due to their precarious
human rights situation.

Based on the information available, it is possible to dispel
some of the most common misconceptions regarding the work of
the Commission, specifically regarding precautionary measures.
These studies show that the Commission has been quite deliberate in focussing its measures to prevent the violation of the most
basic rights. When granting precautionary measure requests, the
Commision’s practices demonstrate a deliberate and cautious
assessment of the request, looking to whether the situtation
truly necessitates precautionary measures given its gravity and
urgency. Thus, the concern of states with precautionary measures does not appear to be legitimate. Rather, such concern
appears to be grounded in renewed sentiments of sovereignity in
some states of the region, and may not be seeking to improve the
protective tools of the Commission.

It is also important to mention that in recent years, the
Commission, in coordination with the Inter-American Court,
has remained in constant contact with all stakeholders of the
System — victims, states, NGOs, academia — in a periodic process of consultation, which has led to significant improvements
in the procedures of the Commission. Many of the changes have
been beneficial to the victims, such as allowing them to directly
litigate their cases before the Court or advancing additional
legal arguments to those initially accepted by the Commission,
among many other positive adjustments. In addition, many other
changes have also recognized the procedural rights of States
in individual complaints by having a more rigorous review of
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